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The Russian Constitutional Court:
A Third Branch of the Russian Federal Government
Jon Rodeback
The 1990s brought with them a
frantic pace of political, social, and
economic change in the Soviet Union and
Russia.
In addition to the outward
revolution of mass demonstrations, civil
wars, and the coup attempt against
Gorbachev, the Soviet Union was also
experiencing an internal revolution. In
particular, perestroika was gradually
incorporating into law such Western
concepts as rule of law, separation of
powers, checks and balances, and limited
government. And these efforts were largely
paralleled on the republic level, particularly
in Russia.
Spring of 1991 brought one of the
most interesting and perhaps most important
developments in Russia: the passage and
signing into law of the "Law on RSFSR
Constitutional Court, " creating the first
Russian court with the power of judicial
In late October, the Russian
review.
Congress of People's Deputies selected and
swore in thirteen judges, and the
Constitutional Court began operating before
the end of the same year.
In its first two years, the Court has
experienced a variety of successes and
failures, from initial victories to a temporary
suspension in October following the
attempted Parliamentary coup. After two
years the questions 100m ever larger and
more urgently. How powerful and effective
is the Constitutional Court? To what extent
has it really influenced Russian government
in the past and what are its prospects for the
future?
Soviet Roots of the Judiciary
Prior to Gorbachev's reforms of the
judicial system, the phrase "Soviet justice"
was an oxymoron-at least by any Western

standard. In the Soviet Union, the USSR
Supreme Court was the highest judicial
body. Elected by the USSR Supreme Soviet
for five-year terms, members of the USSR
Supreme Court were officially independent
of the other branches of government. 1
However, the 1977 Constitution o/the USSR
made the Supreme Court directly
accountable to the Supreme Soviet (ch. 20,
art. 152). This same pattern was followed
on all levels of government (ch. 20, art.
152), and it did not favor the exercise of
justice.
The results are quite dramatic. Even
after Stalin's show trials, the system did not
significantly improve-although it may have
become less injurious to the defendants.
One study even shows that the rate of
acquittals in Soviet courts steadily decreased
from the late 1940s to the 1980s, until by
the mid-1980s "acquittals had practically
disappeared" (Solomon 1987, 531-38). Yet,
the judges did try to ease the effects of the
judicial system, by giving light sentences,
overturning appeals on technicalities, or
remanding cases for retrial after which the
cases were quietly dropped for lack of
evidence (Solomon 1987, 539-41). Hence,
the system sometimes could judge people
"guilty" but not punish them.
Such
incidents of mercy are noteworthy, but such
lenience was severely limited by the Party.
Perestroika and the Judiciary
The Gorbachev era marked a radical
change in the Soviet-and Russian-legal
and political system. At his urging, the
USSR Supreme Soviet created the USSR
Congress of People's Deputies in December
1988, which was actually elected in
pseudodemocratic elections. In the same
month, the Supreme Soviet also began an
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extensive reform of the judicial system.
Constitutional amendments extended the
terms of office of all judges to five years,
ended the popular election of judges on the
local level, and transferred power of election
to the Soviets on the level immediately
superior to the courts. During the next
year, the Congress of People's Deputies
enacted strict penalties for violating the
independence of the courts. Many of the
Soviet republics quickly followed suit by
enacting similar legislation (Butler 1992,

justices, swore in all thirteen, and tabled
selection of the remaining two justices until
the next session of Congress (Zamyatina
1991, 50). Five days later, the new Court
met and selected Valerii Zorkin as Chairman
of the Constitutional Court (Klimov and
Artemev 1991, 60).
A Comparison of Courts
Comparing the Russian Constitutional
Court to the U.S. Supreme Court reveals
some of the strengths and weaknesses of the
Russian Constitutional Court. Beyond the
basic responsibility of judicial review, their
politicians and responsibilities in the
judiciary structure and jurisdictions differ
widely.
Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, the
Constitutional Court is not the ultimate
wielder of judicial power. The Russian
Supreme Court and the Russian Supreme
Court of Arbitration-carry-overs from the
Soviet era (Butler 1992, 112)-each exercise
final judgement in their own jurisdictions.
Theoretically, the Constitutional Court
considered constitutional questions, the
Supreme Court decides civil and criminal
cases, and the Supreme Court of Arbitration
resolves economic disputes. Obviously,
these jurisdictions overlap and create a
"problem of competition" among the
supreme courts, as noted by Deputy
Chairman Vitruk in the Izvestiya Case (cited
in Feofanov 1993, 26).
Additionally, while in the United
States all federal and some state courts can
exercise judicial review, in Russia the
Constitutional Court is the sole judge of
constitutionality (Sharlet 1993, 3). These
constitutional responsibilities specifically
include examining all treaties, laws, and
executive orders. The Constitutional Court
also decides disputes between the executive
and legislative branches and between
members of the Russian Federation.

112-13).
In March 1990, the Supreme Soviet
created the office of the President of the
Soviet Union and elected Gorbachev
President. He subsequently created the
Committee on Constitutional
Supervision-the Soviet forerunner of the
Russian Constitutional Court-"to ensure
that Soviet laws complied with the country's
constitution" (Benn 1992, 178-79). 2 Thus,
by the end of 1991, the Soviet Union had
the beginnings of separate branches of
government, a primordial system of checks
and balances, and a judicial body to enforce
them.
Creation of the Russian Constitutional
Court
In May 1991, the Russian parliament
took a radical step, passing the "Law on
RSFSR Constitutional Court." On May 6,
the Russian Supreme Soviet passed the
original statute. After adding approximately
two hundred amendments, the Russian
Congress of People's Deputies passed the
statute. On July 12, President Yeltsin
signed it into law (Sharlet 1993, 2).
On October 27, after a series of
political turf battles, the Russian Congress
of People's Deputies (CPD) chose ten
members of the thirteen-member Russian
Constitutional Court. 3 On the following
day, the CPD selected three additional
-2-
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Notably, the Constitutional Court does not
normally adjudicate disputes between
citizens or between the citizen and the
government, as the U.S. Supreme Court
does.
Instead, it confines itself to
interpreting the constitution (Zherebenkov
1991, 68). While the U.S. Supreme Court
can sidestep constitutional issues-and often
does-by simply deciding on the specific
the
merits of the case in question;
Constitutional Court must directly confront
constitutional questions, because they are the
only questions which the court can legally
decide.
In addition, while the U.S. Supreme
Court has almost complete control over its
docket, the Constitutional Court exercises
little control over which cases it considers.
The difference lies in the different types of
jurisdictions. Currently, the U.S. Supreme
Court receives few cases of original
jurisdiction; hence, most cases arrive via
petitions for ceniorari, which the Court may
accept or dismiss at its own discretion
(O'Brien 1991,96). Conversely, most cases
reach the Constitutional Court by appeal on
original jurisdiction, so the Court must hear
them (Sharlet 1993, 3). With such an open
door to disputes, the Constitutional Court
consistently finds itself embroiled in fierce
power struggles between the branches of
government or simply overwhelmed by the
sheer number of cases. 4
However, the Constitutional Court
does have on defense to hide behind: the law
specifically forbids the Constitutional Court
to consider "political questions"
(Wishnevsky 1993, 3). (Judicial precedent
imposes a similar restraint upon the U. S.
Supreme Court.)
Of course, the line
between political and constitutional questions
is blurry at best, and since the Constitutional
Court determines what is a political
question, it could conceivably use this
loophole to control its docket. The Court
could declare undesirable case political

questions and conversely ignore the political
nature of cases which the Court wanted to
hear-a time-honored practice of the U.S.
Supreme Court.
Until ratification of the new
constitution on December 12, 1993, the
Constitutional Court continually wrestled
with the inadequate Constitution of the
Brezhnev era. Written and ratified under
Soviet communism, it bore little relation to
the political environment in which the
Constitutional Court was working. Even
Chairman Zorkin, the strongest and most
vocal supporter of compliance with the
Brezhnev constitution, acknowledged the
paradox in having "to comply with an
obsolete Constitution" Muratov 1992, 45).
Finally, the Russian public attitude
toward the law and the courts radically
differs from the American legal tradition,
even from the earliest days of the United
States. The U.S. Supreme Court started in
1789 with the advantage of a public which
generally upheld and respected the law and
court decisions. The Russian Constitutional
Court has no such advantage, and like any
other court, it depends on the executive and
legislative branches to enforce its decisions
until it gains a reputation and a prestige that
the other branches dare not defy.
If the first few decades of the U.S.
Supreme Court teach any lesson, it is that
supreme courts walk an extremely shaky
tightrope during the first years. The first
decade saw a rapid changeover in personnel,
including three different Chief Justices. 5
During the second decade, President
Jefferson and Congress blatantly tried to
destroy the Supreme Court. With some
adroit legal maneuvering, Congress
completely canceled the Supreme Court's
1802 session. Then, in early 1802, the U.S.
House of Representatives impeached a
federal district judge and Supreme Court
Justice Samuel Chase. 6 In this volatile
environment, only Chief Justice Marshall's
-3-
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politically astute decision of Marbury v.
Madison succeeded in saving the Supreme

with the Court's decision (Shakhray 1992,
39). Having successfully stared down the
powerful Russian President, the Court had
clearly established itself as a real political
and legal force.
However, the next major case turned
into a disaster for the Constitutional Court.
In early 1992, the leaders of the Tartar
Autonomous Republic announced a public
referendum on whether Tartarstan should be
a separate state within the Russian
Federation. The Court quickly heard the
case and on March 13 declared various
sections of the referendum unconstitutional
as an attempt to secede from the
Federation. 7 But three days later, during a
special session, the Tartar parliament
defiantly chose not to alter the referendum
but simply to declare that it was not a
referendum on secession. Two days later,
Zorkin addressed the Russian parliament-as
per his Constitutional prerogative-asking
them to enforce the Court's ruling. The
parliament concurred and called upon
President Yeltsin to enforce the Court order.
However, Yeltsin ignored the parliamentary
resolution and did nothing except offer his
verbal support. Consequently, the Tartar
referendum proceeded as planned and the
Court was publicly embarrassed
(Wishnevsky 1993, 3; Sharlet 1993, 7-8).
Before the Tartar Case, the Court
had established itself as a legitimate court,
but by even hearing the Tartar Case the
Court pointlessly sacrificed much of its
newly acquired prestige. First, nationalism
is the most volatile issue in the Russian
Federation. The Constitutional court simply
does not have the power to enforce any
decision on the issue without the full support
of the legislative and executive branches,
which it never received.
Second, the
Constitutional Court acted much too hastily.
Tartarstan had not even held the referendum
before the Court ruled against it. The Court
should have at least waited until after the

Court. The Russian Constitutional Court
has not had the similar lUXUry of two
decades to gather its strength.
The Initial Decisions
Yet, with all the problems the
Constitutional Court faces, its creation could
not have been timed better. Two months
after the Court was created, President
Gorbachev resigned and the USSR Supreme
Soviet voted itself and the USSR out of
existence. The Russian Constitutional Court
wasted no time in stepping into the resulting
On December 26,
power vacuum.
1991-the same day the USSR Supreme
Soviet dissolved itself-the Court
"unanimously adopted a sensational
statement," declaring that it would "stand in
the way of dictatorship and tyranny,
whatever their source" (Orlov 1991, 43).
The same day, Chairman Zorkin announced
in a press conference that the Court would
soon examine the constitutionality of a
Presidential decree merging the two
ministries, as well as several legislative acts
of the Supreme Soviet (INTERFAX 1991b,
39).
After several quick hearings, on
January 15 the Court announced a
unanimous ruling against Yeltsin' s decree
merging the RSFSR Ministry of Security
and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The
Court declared that the merger violated the
constitutional "separation of powers . . .
which gave only the legislature the power to
create ministries" (Sharlet 1993, 6). This
decisive ruling won instant praise from the
Russian media, which jubilantly declared
that "law and Russia are not two
incompatible things" (Reshetnikov 1992,
38). Yeltsin accused the Court of playing
politics instead of interpreting the
constitution, but he did grudgingly comply
-4-
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vote to consider the matter; a "no" vote
would have rendered the whole case mute.
Finally, the referendum was legally
nonbinding and an extremely politicized
issue. The Court could have-and should
have-simply declared it a "political
question" and therefore nonjusticiable.
Instead, the activist Court fought a hopeless
and useless battle which eventually damaged
its credibility.

Adding to the inherent complexity was the
complete absence of a system of Court
regulations. Hence, the trial proceeded on
a completely ad hoc basis. The Court
probably intentionally intensified the
complexity and monotony in order to defuse
the highly explosive situation. The rationale
was that if people became bored enough,
they would not even care about the final
ruling and the Court would escape relatively
unscathed (Sharlet 1993, 17).
Yet, as the trial proceeded, it
gradually became evident from the questions
and procedural votes that the justices did not
agree with each other and that the final
decision was unpredictable, which
introduced a new type of excitement and
interest. All this time, the Court-especially
Zorkin-tried to portray this trial as a
completely judicial proceeding with no hint
of "political expediency." They were only
partiall y successful. While some of the
press spoke favorably of the Court, others
referred to the trial as "a political farce"
and a "political show trial" (Sharlet 1993,
23).
The Court still might have escaped
relatively uninjured if it had not tried to
force Gorbachev to testify. When the trial
began in May, the Court subpoenaed him to
testify. He flatly refused, citing executive
immunity. In July, Gorbachev announced
that he and Chairman Zorkin had agreed that
he would not need to testify. Yet, shortly
afterwards, the rest of the Constitutional
Court overruled Zorkin and tried to force
Gorbachev to testify (thereby violating the
constitution).8 Gorbachev still refused to
appear in Court. The Court then fined
Gorbachev one hundred rubles for contempt
of court-the maximum penalty allowed by
law. The Ministry of Security and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs followed by
revoking Gorbachev's passport, thus
preventing him from leaving Russia. If he
did try to leave, the border police were

The CPSU Case
The Court repeated the same
mistakes with an appeal by the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the
RSFSR Communist Party. Sharlet observes:
If the Russian Constitutional Court had followed its
legislative mandate, it would have invoked the "political
question" rule and avoided the CPSU case. (1993, 17)

Conversely, if the Court had succeeded in
successfully resolving the question, the
Court's prestige and power would have
taken a quantum leap forward.
Following the attempted August 1991
coup, Yeltsin had outlawed both parties by
executive decree. The parties appealed to
the Constitutional Court, and the Court
accepted the case in December 1991, but
deliberately delayed hearing the case until it
had established some sense of legitimacy-a
wise move, as far as it went. However,
during the interim, the Sixth Congress of
People's Deputies amended the 1978 RSFSR
Constitution more than two hundred times,
and one of these amendments specifically
extended the jurisdiction of the
Constitutional Court to "political parties and
public associations" (Sharlet 1993, 19-20).
When the CPSU hearing finally
opened on May 26, 1992, the trial quickly
became a disappointment to the media and
spectators. They had expected a sensational
confrontation, but instead found a seemingly
endless and complex legal proceeding.
-5-
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ordered to arrest him. These illegalities
inflamed public outrage against the Court,
which eventually relented and stopped
harassing Gorbachev (Wishnevsky 1993,5).
The political maneuvering did not
end with harassing Gorbachev. During the
court proceedings, "Yeltsin bestowed on the
justices a substantial pay raise" (Sharlet
1993, 28). Then, on October 28, Yeltsin
upped the stakes by issuing a decree banning
the National Salvation Front (NSF), a
political organization of extreme nationalists,
monarchists, and communists. The Court
responded by placing the NSF appeal next
on its docket.
Finally, on November 30, the Court
issued an 11-2 decision finding that Yeltsin's
decree banning the central party
organizations of the CPSU was
constitutional.
However, the decrees
confiscating property and outlawing local
party organizations were found
unconstitutional.
The ruling represented a partial
victory to both sides-an obvious attempt to
placate both Yeltsin and the CPSU. The
dissenting justices- Luchin and Ebzdeevseverely criticized the decision as politically
expedient rather than legally sound, which is
probably an accurate evaluation (Katanyan
1992, 11-12). The spit vote and dissenting
opinions represent a serious deepening of the
rifts within the Court.

and the parliament eclipsed the importance
of the Court's ruling.
The crisis peaked on March 20,
when Yeltsin announced "special rule" by
the president. True to form, Zorkin quickly
denounced the action as unconstitutional,
and a few days later the Court reviewed
Yeltsin's speech and declared his decree
unconstitutional by a 9-3 vote. Yeltsin
consequently backed down and issued a
sterilized executive order which did not
contain any of the unconstitutional
provisions (Kasyanenko 1993, 33-34; Sharlet
1993, 32).9
Although the March crisis marked a
temporary victory for the Constitutional
Court, it left the Court ultimately weaker.
Now the Court could no longer claim
neutrality in the conflict between Yeltsin and
the parliament. Instead of thinking clearly,
Zorkin had led the Court unarmed into a
dangerous political no-man' s land.
In
addition, his denouncement of Yeltsin's
decree prior to the Court's decision was a
gross violation of his sworn neutrality as a
judge. Also, the Court made the mistake of
issuing a preemptive decision, which made
them look extremely foolish once Yeltsin
issued his sterilized decree. If the Court
had waited until Yeltsin actually issued the
order, they could have avoided
embarrassment and might not have had to
consider the issue.
However, once drawn into the fray,
the Court faced increasing political pressure
during the summer. The Court and its
members had been bothered by threats and
security breaches since their first ruling in
1992 (Muratov 1992, 44-45). After the
March incident, Yeltsin did his best to
exploit the Court's dependence on the
executive branch.
In June, Chairman
Zorkin was deprived of his official car, his
portable phone, and his state dacha. Next,
Yeltsin directed the Main Security
Directorate to stop guarding the Court's

The 1993 Decision and Power Politics
On January 15, the Court began
hearings on the NSF case, but initially two
justices- Ametistov and Kononovboycotted the hearings. In spite of the
initial delays and divisions among the
justices, the Court quickly decided the case
finding Yeltsin' s decree unconstitutional.
However, by this time-mid-February-the
power-sharing agreement was collapsing,
and the escalating conflict between Yeltsin
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building,
the judges, and their
families-leaving
them completely
unprotected in what had become a dangerous
city. Finally, the state information agency
ITAR-TASS simply refused to distribute
official Constitutional Court documents
(Kravtsov 1993, 29-30).
Then, on September 22, President
Yeltsin unconstitutionally dissolved the
Congress of People's Deputies and the
Supreme Soviet. Ironically, in the same
speech Yeltsin admitted that his actions were
unconstitutional but justified them with
political necessity (Yeltsin 1993b, 8-9).
Predictably, Zorkin immediately and
unequivocally denounced Yeltsin's action
and then led a deeply divided Court in
overturning Ye1tsin's decrees. However,
within a week Zorkin had "backtracked on
his previous uncompromising criticism of
Yeltsin's actions" and was seeking some
sort of compromise arrangement (Slater
1993a-1993b).
Zorkin's efforts to broker a second
agreement failed, and government forces
were eventually forced to crush the
parliamentary uprising.
Shortly after
regaining control, Yeltsin publicly blamed
the Constitutional Court for inciting the
violence (Yeltsin 1993a, 37-38).
He
subsequently suspended the Constitutional
Court until after the December elections and
forced Chairman Zorkin to resign (Teague
1993; Tolz and Wishnevsky 1993).

People's Deputies, Zorkin successfully
brokered a power-sharing agreement
between Yeltsin and parliament (Wishnevsky
1993, 7-8). This incredible success instantly
made him extremely popular with the
general public. Some of the press even
referred to him as the "Man of the Year,"
and a public opinion poll in early 1993
named him as the fifth most powerful
politician (Sharlet 1993, 31).
Yet, at the same time his actions
were dividing the members of the
Constitutional Court. As time progressed,
Zorkin became even more involved in
politics. Deputy Chairman Vitruk critically
observed, "It has become almost the norm
for Constitutional Court Chairman V.
Zorkin to appear in the mass media and to
make political statements and assessments at
meetings of various kinds" (Feofanov 1993,
26). For 1992 and the first half of 1993,
FBIS reports alone include over forty
statements by Zorkin to the press, and few
of them directly relate to his responsibilities
as Chairman of the Constitutional Court. 10
Particularly annoying was Zorkin's habit of
preempting the Court-stating his opinion on
a case before the Court even heard it.
About Zorkin's unprofessionalism, Deputy
Chairman Vitruk appropriately advised, "If
you want to be a politician, take off your
judge's gown" (Feofanov 1993, 27).

Chairman Zorkin

Considering the political and social
environment in which the Constitutional
Court was born, the Court has not done
poorly in its first two years. The Court has
definitely increased its own prestige and
power and also that of the entire judicial
system. Its huge caseloadll shows this.
However, this increased power has also
increased the stakes in the political games it
plays.

Conclusion

The rise and fall of Chairman Zorkin
itself sheds some light on the Court.
Following the CPSU decision, Zorkin
became deeply involved in mediating the
growing dispute between Yeltsin and
parliament.
Even then-December
1992-rumors of disbanding parliament were
circulating.
Yet somehow, during the
December session of the Congress of
-7-
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The first decision firmly established
the legitimacy and power of the Court, but
some of the subsequent decisions seriously
injured the Court. The biggest failing of the
Court to date has been its excessive
activism. In such an unstable constitutional
environment as the Russian Federation,
judicial activism will eventually backfire.
And when it does backfire, the very
existence of the Court is in danger-as the
events of October 1993 vividly illustrate.
The Court should never have considered the
Tartarstan case and probably should not
have accepted the CPSU appeal. While
most of its decisions were legally defensible,
they were not politically wise. The Court
has yet to learn that it cannot make judicial
decisions in a political vacuum.
The Court should instead conserve its
political capital for the most critical cases,
and otherwise decide only routine matters.
The Court cannot rely solely on legal
idealism; it is a quick form of political
suicide. Until the Court has developed a
strong reputation and sense of legitimacy in
Russia, the Court should avoid conflicts
between the executive and legislative
branches as much as possible by doing as
little as possible.
While Chairman Zorkin did show
skill in negotiating the December 1992
power-sharing agreement, his political

grandstanding has seriously damaged the
Court's image and divided the justices. By
forcing him to resign, Yeltsin has probably
unwittingly strengthened the Court in the
long run.
Finally, recent events suggest the
Court will become pro-Yeltsin and will
consequently do little to contradict his will.
The recently-ratified Constitution
conveniently allows Yeltsin to immediately
appoint at least seven more judges to the
Court to expand its number to nineteen. 12
Even President Franklin D. Roosevelt would
have been envious of this court-packing
scheme. Presumably, Yeltsin will succeed
in taming the Court in the short term. Yet,
the fact that Yeltsin even included provisions
in the new Constitution which preserve the
Constitutional Court suggests that the Court
is already too powerful for Yeltsin to
completely disband it, which he certainly
would not object to doing-the Court has
caused him much grief since its inception.
Hence in the next few years the new
Constitutional Court will probably exercise
significantly less independence from the
executive branch, but it will also be
protected by the executive branch. In such
a position, the Court could conceivably
evolve into a truly independent branch of
government over the next few decades.
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NOTES
1. The law specifically states that the "judges . . . of USSR Supreme Court are independent
and subordinate only to the law" (Law on the USSR Supreme Court 1980, 14).
2. The USSR Committee of Constitutional Supervision was not particularly effective during
its short existence. The Russian Constitutional Court even referred to its "sad fate" in a
press release (INTERFAX 1991a, 39).
3. The first ten members of the Court were Nikolay V. Vitruk, N. T. Vedernikov, Valerii.
D. Zorkin, T. D. Morshchakova, V. 1. Oleynik, Yu. D. Rudkin, N. V. Selezhev, O. 1.
Tiunov, B. S. Ebveyev, and Ernest M. Ametistov (TASS International Service 1991, 67).
4. Sharlet notes that by the end of 1992 the Constitutional Court had decided only nine cases
but resolved approximately sixteen thousand complaints (1993, 8).
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5. Chief Justice John Jay (1789-95) resigned in 1995 to become an envoy to England, and
when he returned, he refused a second appointment as chief justice. Chief Justice John
Rutledge resigned without ever sitting on the Court. Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth (179618(0) served an unremarkable five years (O'Brien 1991, 30; Gunther 1991 Bl).
6. In March 1804, the U.S. Senate removed Federal District Judge John Pickering from
office. In 1805, Justice Chase barely survived the Senate vote. If Justice Chase had been
removed, other impeachments and removals would certainly have followed (Gunther 1991,
11).
7. Justice Ernest Ametistov dissented, arguing that the referendum was merely an exercise
of the "universally recognized right of nations to self-determination" (Wishnevsky 1993,
3)-an explosive doctrine in a multination-state like Russia.
8. "Article 67 of the Russian Constitution prohibits the forcing of any person to give
evidence that could be used against him at a criminal trial" (Wishnevsky 1993, 4).
9. Based on the Court's ruling, the Congress of People's Deputies tried and failed to
impeach Yeltsin.
10. The examples of U.S. Supreme Court justices sharply contrast with Zorkin's flamboyant
style. Supreme Court justices lead extremely quiet lives and rarely make public statements
outside of their court opinions.
11. During spring of 1992, Zorkin reported that the Court was receiving "hundreds of
[individual] complaints" every day. At the end of 1992, the Russian Constitutional Court
had decided nine cases and "settled approximately 16,000 complaints" (Sharlet 1993, 8).
12. The Draft Constitution of the Russian Federation expands the number of justices on the
Constitutional court to nineteen. With Zorkin's resignation and the previous two vacancies,
Yeltsin can immediately appoint seven new justices (see Art. 83 and 125).

-11-

